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Abstract. Provenance metadata can be valuable in data sharing settings, where
it can be used to help data consumers form judgements regarding the reliability
of the data produced by third parties. However, some parts of provenance may
be sensitive, requiring access control, or they may need to be simplified for the
intended audience. Both these issues can be addressed by a single mechanism
for creating abstractions over provenance, coupled with a policy model to drive
the abstraction. Such mechanism, which we refer to as abstraction by grouping,
simultaneously achieves partial disclosure of provenance, and facilitates its con-
sumption. In this paper we introduce a formal foundation for this type of abstrac-
tion, grounded in the W3C PROV model; describe the associated policy model;
and briefly present its implementation, the ProvAbs tool for interactive experi-
mentation with policies and abstractions.
1 Introduction
Provenance, a formal representation of the production process of data, may facilitate
the assessment and improvement of the quality of data products, as well as the valida-
tion and reproducibility of scientific experimental datasets. This expectation predicates
on an assumption of interoperability between mutually independent producers and con-
sumers of provenance. The W3C PROV generic provenance model [1] is intended to
facilitate such interoperability, by providing a common syntax and semantics for prove-
nance models, and thus enable provenance-aware data sharing at Web scale.
1.1 Abstracting provenance
For provenance to be useful, it must be represented at a level of abstraction that is ap-
propriate to the consumer. For example, system-level provenance which includes indi-
vidual system calls and I/O operations may be appropriate for system auditing purposes,
while a higher level description may be more appropriate to determine how a document
evolved to its final version, e.g. through a series of edits involving multiple authors.
In some cases, the higher abstraction can be computed from the detailed representa-
tion. One such case occurs when provenance describes the execution of a workflow or
dataflow, which can itself be described at multiple levels of abstraction. Early work on
provenance views (Zoom) [2] is an example. Here users specify the abstraction they re-
quire on the workflow, and that is used to compute a corresponding abstract view of the
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workflow’s trace. More generally, however, a trace may represent arbitrary process exe-
cutions and data derivations, and one cannot rely on a formal description of the process
to specify a suitable abstraction.
The problem of abstracting over provenance in such a more general setting has
been addressed in later work, notably the ProPub system [3]. Here the main goal is
to ensure that sensitive elements of the trace are abstracted out, by means of a redac-
tion process. In ProPub, users specify edit operations on a provenance graph, such as
anonymizing, abstracting, and hiding certain parts of it. ProPub operates on a simpli-
fied provenance model (which pre-dates PROV) which only includes use/generation
relations, and adopts an “apply–detect–repair” approach. First, user-defined abstraction
rules are applied to the graph, then consistency violations that may occur in the resulting
new graph are detected, and finally a set of edits are applied to repair such violations.
In some cases, this causes nodes that the user wanted removed to be reintroduced, and
it is not always possible to satisfy all user rules.
1.2 Contributions
Our work is motivated by the need to control the complexity of a provenance graph
by increasing its level of abstraction, as well as to protect the confidentiality of parts
of the graph. Our specific contributions in this paper are threefold. Firstly, we define
a Provenance Abstraction Model (PAM) centred on the Group abstraction operator.
Group replaces a set of nodes Vgr ⊂ V in a valid PROV graph PG with a new abstract
node, resulting in the modified graph PG′. The rewriting preserves the validity of the
graph, in the sense made precise below, and it does not introduce any new relations into
PG ′, which are not justified by existing PG relations. A formal account of this operator
is given in Sec.3. A preliminary but more extended account of this work appears in our
technical report [1].
Secondly, we present a simple policy model and language for controlling abstrac-
tion, based on the assumption that provenance owners want to control the disclosure of
their provenance graphs to one or more receivers, with varying levels of trust (Sec.4).
The model lets the owners associate a policy, pol , to a graph. Policy evaluation results in
a sensitivity value s(v, pol) being associated to each node v. Assuming, as in the Bell-
Lapadula model [4], that a clearance level cl can be associated to each receiver, the
nodes Vgr to be abstracted in PG according to pol are those for which s(v, pol) > cl.
Finally, we present the ProvAbs tool, which implements both Group and the pol-
icy language. ProvAbs has been demonstrated on our confidentiality preservation use
case, in the context of intelligence information exchange [5].
1.3 Related work
In addition to the Zoom and ProPub prototypes cited above, strands of research that
are relevant to this work include (i) provenance-specific graph redaction, (ii) graph
anonymization, and (ii) Provenance Access Control (PAC). Provenance redaction [6]
employs a graph grammar technique to edit provenance that is expressed using the
Open Provenance Model [7](a precursor to PROV), as well as a redaction policy lan-
guage. The critical issue of ensuring that specific relationships are preserved, however,
is addressed only informally in the paper, i.e., with no reference to OPM semantics.
Extensions to the relational data anynomization framework to graph data structures,
specifically for social network data, have been developed [8,9,10]. The approach, in-
volving randomly removing and adding arcs, will not work for PROV, however, as it
would result in new, false dependencies. More relevantly, PAC is concerned with en-
forcing access control on parts of a provenance graph, in the context of secure prove-
nance exchange. An analysis of the associated challenges [11] notes that provenance of
data can be more sensitive than the data itself. In a similar setting, [12] accounts for the
possibility of forgery of provenance by malicious users, and of collusion amongst users
to reveal sensitive provenance to others. However, the paper stops short of providing
any hints at technical solutions, and indeed it is not clear how these problems are spe-
cific to provenance, as opposed to data sharing in general. Finally, our policy language
is loosely related to an XACML-based policy language [13] the access control system
for provenance, where path queries are used to specify target elements of the graph.
2 Essential PROV
We now introduce the PROV concepts that are required for the rest of the paper. The
PROV data model[1] defines three types of sets: (i) Entities (En), i.e., data, documents;
(ii) Activities (Act), which represent the execution of some process over a period of
time, and (iii) Agents (Ag), i.e., humans, computing systems, software. The following
set of core relations is also defined amongst these sets:
usage:used ⊆ Act × En generation:genBy ⊆ En ×Act
derivation:wasDerivedFrom ⊆ En × En association:waw ⊆ Act ×Ag
delegation:abo ⊆ Ag ×Ag attribution:wat ⊆ En ×Ag
For simplicity and due to space constraints, in this paper we restrict our scope to
just En , Act , and relations used and genBy . The extension of this work to Agents and
their relations (abo, wat), is available from our extended tech report [5]. The extension
to other core relations such as wasDerivedFrom is straightforward and will not be
discussed here.
We denote instances of these relations as genBy(e, a), used(a, e), etc., where e ∈
En, a ∈ Act . Following common practice, we view a set I of such binary relation
instances as a digraph G = (V,E), where V = En ∪ Act and E is a set of labelled
edges, and where x r←− y ∈ E iff r(x, y) ∈ I.3 Finally, we denote the set of all such
provenance graphs as PGgu/ea, to indicate that they only contain genBy and used
relations amongst En and Act nodes.
Fig. 1 shows an example of a PGgu/ea graph, where ovals and rectangles repre-
sent Entities, Activities, and Agents, respectively. The graph describes a document,
advice-report, which was ultimately derived from twitter feeds captured at differ-
ent times, through a series of query, consolidation, and analysis activities. The agents
to whom the documents and activities are ascribed are omitted for simplicity. Note also
that the nodes are decorated with user-defined properties, such as Status.
A set of formal constraints are defined on the PROV data model. These are described
in the PROV-CONSTRAINTS document [14]. Two groups of constraints are relevant
3 Conventionally, we orient these edges from right to left, to denote that the relation “points back
to the past”.
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Fig. 1. Example provenance graph of a complex document production process. The ProvAbs
model is designed to abstract some of the elements in the graph, for instance to avoid their dis-
closure. Coloured boxes denote ProvAbs sensitivity annotations, explained in Sec. 4.
here. The first (Constraint 50 — typing4) formalises the set-theoretical definitions of the
relations given above. Additionally, Constraint 555 stipulates that entities and activities
are disjoint: En ∩Act = ∅.
The second group concerns temporal ordering amongst events. PROV defines a set
of instantaneous events which mark the lifetime boundaries of Entities (generation, in-
validation), Activities (start, end), and Agents (start, end), as well as some of the inter-
actions amongst those elements, such as generation and usage of an entity by an activity,
attribution of an entity to an agent, and more. Optionally, events may be explicitly as-
sociated to PROV elements. In the following, we denote the start and end of an activity
a by startEv(a), endEv(a), respectively, and the generation and usage events for an
entity e and activity a with genEv(genBy(e, a)), useEv(used(a, e)), respectively (as
mentioned, Agents are beyond the scope of this paper). PROV events form a preorder,
which we denote . The relevant temporal constraints are expressed as follows.
4 http://www.w3.org/TR/prov-constraints/#typing
5 http://www.w3.org/TR/prov-constraints/#entity-activity-disjoint
– C1: generation-generation-ordering (Constraint 39): If an entity is generated
by more than one activity, then the generation events must all be simultaneous.
Let e ∈ En, a1, a2 ∈ Act , and let genBy(e, a1) and genBy(e, a2) hold. Then the
following must hold:
genEv(genBy(e, a1))  genEv(genBy(e, a2)) and
genEv(genBy(e, a2))  genEv(genBy(e, a1))
– C2: generation-precedes-usage(Constraint 37): A generation event for an en-
tity must precede any usage event for that entity. Let a ∈ Act , e ∈ En , and let
used(a, e)), genBy(e, a) hold. Then:
genEv(genBy(e, a))  useEv(used(a, e))
– C3: usage-within-activity (Constraint 33): Any usage of e ∈ En by some a ∈
Act cannot precede the start of a and must precede the end of a. Let used(a, e)
hold. Then:
startEv(a)  useEv(used(a, e))  endEv(a)
– C4: generation-within-activity (Constraint 34): The generation of e by a cannot
precede the start of a and must precede the end of a. If genBy(e, a), then:
startEv(a)  genEv(genBy(e, a))  endEv(a)
A valid PROV graph is one that satisfies all the constraints defined in the PROV-
CONSTR document [14]. Within our scope, a valid PGgu/ea graph is one that satisfies
the constraints defined here.
3 Abstraction by grouping
Simple edits that can be applied to a graph to protect confidentiality of its content in-
clude removing individual nodes or edges. Alternatively, the node’s identity can be
changed, or the values associated to any of its properties can be removed. These straight-
forward edits are legal in PROV and they will not be discussed further. 6 We are instead
concerned with edits that replace a group of nodes with a new abstract node.
3.1 Core concepts
To model this type of abstraction, we are going to define a Group operator which takes
a graph G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea and a subset Vgr ⊂ V of its nodes, and produces a
modified graph G′ = (V ′, E′) ∈ PGgu/ea, where Vgr is replaced with a new single
node. Group is closed under composition, thus allowing for further abstraction by re-
peated grouping (abstraction of abstraction). Let vabs ∈ V ′ be an abstract node in G′.
We denote the set Vgr of nodes in G that it replaces by source(vabs).
6 Note that removing an arbitrary node may result in disconnected fragments of the graph, as
in general one cannot simply add edges to reconnect the remaining nodes, unless those can
be inferred from standard PROV constraints. For instance, if activity a is removed from the
graph: {used(a, e1), genBy(e2, a)}, this results in two disconnected nodes e1, e2, because
no relationship can be inferred between them from the original graph.
In order to understand the requirements for defining Group, consider the replace-
ments in Fig. 2. On the left, nodes Vgr = {a1, e4, e5} are replaced with a new node
e′. Simply using the original edges to connect the remaining nodes to e′ leads to type
constraint violations, namely for the new edges e1 ← e′, e2 ← e′, and thus to an invalid
graph.
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Fig. 2. Issues with naive replacement of groups of nodes.
Now consider Fig.2(b), where Vgr = {e1, e3, e4, e5}. In this case, the simple strat-
egy or replacing Vgr with e′ and reconnecting the remaining nodes leads to the two
cycles: {genBy(e′, a1), used(a1, e′)} and {genBy(e′, a3), used(a3, e′)}. Such cycles
are legal, and in particular they are consistent with temporal constraints C1-C4 above.
Indeed, it is easy to imagine a situation where an activity a first generates an entity e,
and then makes use of e. For instance, a could be a programming artifact, i.e., an object
that first instantiates a new object e, and then makes use of e. In this case, the event
ordering is
startEv(a)  genEv(e, a)  useEv(a, e)  endEv(a) (1)
Yet, we argue that introducing new cycles during abstraction is undesirable. Intuitively,
this is because cycles make stronger assumptions on the possible temporal ordering of
events than those in the original graph, and thus are only representative of a restrictive
class of graphs. To elaborate more precisely on this point, we first introduce new defini-
tions of generation and usage events for an abstract node vabs, from the corresponding
events associated to source(vabs). For this, consider the definition of generation and
usage in [1]:
Generation is the completion of production of a new entity (Sec. 5.1.3).
Usage is the beginning of utilizing an entity (Sec. 5.1.4).
An abstract node vabs can be thought of as representing the collection source(vabs)
in the new graph. Thus, its “generation” is logically defined as the completion of pro-
duction of its source nodes, that is, its associated generation event should be the latest
generation event from within its source. Note that associating a generation event to an
abstract node requires the existence of a generating activity. Although this is not always
provided as a result of abstraction by grouping, Inference 7 in [1] ensures that such
generating activity exists. Thus we can formally define generation for abstract nodes,
as follows.
Definition 1 (Abstract node generation event). Let Vgr ∈ V and vabs be a new ab-
stract node, with source(vabs) = Vgr and generating activity a. Define:
genEv(genBy(vabs, a)) = max
ei∈source(vabs)
genEv(genBy(ei, ai))
where ai is the generating activity of ei.
Symmetrically, we associate a usage event to vabs, which is the earliest usage event for
the nodes in ei ∈ source(vabs).
Definition 2 (Abstract node usage events). Let Vgr ∈ V , G′ = (V ′, E′) be the new
abstract graph, and let vabs ∈ V ′ be a new abstract node. If there exists an activity
a ∈ V ′ such that used(a, vabs) holds, then
useEv(used(a, vabs)) = min
ei∈source(vabs)
useEv(used(ai, ei))
where ai is an activity that used ei.
With these definitions in place, temporal constraint (1), which applies to simple
usage-generation cycles in the graph, translates into the requirement that every entity
ei ∈ source(vabs) be generated before any use of ei. This constraint ties to each other
the generation and usage time of the nodes that are abstracted. In the original graph,
however, there is no such requirement: the generation of any entity is, in general, inde-
pendent of that of others. This suggests that a new generation-usage cycle in the abstract
graph adds constraints that are not present in the original graph, and should therefore be
avoided. Note that ProPub [3] also insists on avoiding cycles, but the formal argument
in support of this requirement does not appear to be clearly grounded in semantics.
To summarize, the requirements for Group when G is rewritten into G′ are: (i)
no type constraint violations must occur in G′, (ii) no new relationships that are not
also present in G are introduced in G′, and (iii) no new usage-generation cycles are
introduced in G′.
3.2 Convexity, Closure, extensions, and replacement
Intuitively, the reason for cycles such as the one in Fig.2(b) is that set Vgr is not “con-
vex”, that is, there are paths in G that lead out of Vgr and then back in again. This
observation suggests the introduction of a preliminary closure operation, aimed at en-
suring “convexity” and therefore acyclicity. This is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Path Closure). Let G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea be a provenance graph, and
let Vgr ⊂ V . For each pair vi, vj ∈ Vgr such that there is a directed path vi  vj in
G, let Vij ⊂ V be the set of all nodes in the path. The Path Closure of Vgr in G is
pclos(Vgr, V ) =
⋃
vi,vj∈Vgr
Vij
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Fig. 3. Grouping by closure and extension.
Fig. 3(b) shows closure applied to the example of Fig.2, i.e.
pclos({e1, e3, e4, e5}, G) = {e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3}. The result of replacing this
set with e′ is shown in (c). However, while this solves the cycle problem, the graph
still violates type constraints, namely on the new edges e2 ← e′ and e6 ← e′. In this
example, we can construct a new group of nodes, {e′, e2, e6}, on the graph that results
from the first replacement, and replace it with a new node e′′. The resulting graph (d)
is valid.
To preserve validity in the general case, we are going to first extend the closure in
(b) to include e-nodes e2, e6, and then replace the resulting set with e′′ (the “extend
and replace” arrow from (b) to (d) in the figure). Following this approach, Group is
defined as the composition of three functions: closure, defined above, extension, and
replacement, as follows.
The extension of a set Vgr ⊂ V relative to type t ∈ {En,Act} is Vgr augmented
with all its adjacent nodes, in either direction, of type t. Formally:
Definition 4 (extend ). Let G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea, t ∈ {En,Act}.
extend(Vgr, G, t) = {v′|(v, v′) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ Vgr ∧ type(v′) = t)} ∪
{v|(v′, v) ∈ E ∧ v ∈ Vgr ∧ type(v′) = t)} ∪ Vgr
In our example:
extend({e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3}, G,En) = {e1, e3, e4, e5, a1, a3, e2, e6}
Note that all sink nodes in extend(Vgr, G, t) are of type t by construction.
Replacement. Let G = (V,E), V ′gr ⊂ V be obtained using extend , and let vnew be a
new node symbol that does not appear in V . Function replace replaces V ′ with vnew
in V , and connects vnew to the rest of the graph, as follows. Let ϑout(V ′gr), ϑin(V
′
gr),
and ϑint(V ′gr) denote the set of arcs of G leading out of V
′
gr, leading into V
′
gr, Each
arc (v′, v) ∈ ϑout(V ′gr) is replaced with a new arc (vnew, v), and each arc (v, v′) ∈
ϑin(V
′
gr) is replaced with a new arc (v, vnew), both of the same relation type. Arcs in
ϑint(V
′
gr) are removed along with the nodes in V
′
gr. Indeed, all sink nodes in V
′
gr are of
type t as noted above, and so is vnew by construction. Thus, sink nodes are replaced by
a node vnew of the same type. Since the arcs have the same type as those they replace,
it follows that replace preserves type correctness. It is also easy to verify that each new
edge in G′ can be mapped to an existing edge in G (proof omitted).
Definition 5 (Replace). replace(Vgr, vnew, G) = (V ′, E′), where:
V ′ = V \ Vgr ∪ {vnew}
E′ = E \ (ϑout(Vgr) ∪ ϑin(Vgr) ∪ ϑint(Vgr)) ∪ ϑ′out(Vgr) ∪ ϑ′in(Vgr)
3.3 T-grouping
We can now define Group as a composition of closure, extensions, and replacement.
In general, nodes in Vgr can be either En or Act . It is necessary to specify the type of
the replacement node, as this may lead to different results. To make this explicit, we
denote the operator by t-grouping (i.e, e-grouping or a-grouping, respectively). In the
next section, we clarify how user-defined policies are used to control the application of
t-grouping to a provenance graph.
Definition 6 (t-Grouping). Let G = (V,E) ∈ PGgu/ea, Vgr ∈ V , t ∈ {En,Act},
and let vnew be a new node with type(vnew) = t. Then:
Group(G,Vgr, vnew, t) = replace(extend(pclos(Vgr, V ), V, t), vnew, G)
Note sink nodes in the closure are homogeneous and are replaced by a node of the
same type t. This satisfies the necessary condition for replace to perform correctly.
Fig. 4(a-1, a-2) illustrates Group(G, {e4, a2}, vnew,Act), while Fig. 4(e-1, e-2,e-3)
shows Group(G, {e4, a2}, vnew,En). Note that a new pattern arises in the case of e-
grouping as shown in Fig. 4(e-1, e-2). Now the extension leads to Vcl = Vgr ∪ {e5},
which in turn leads to the pattern shown in Fig. 4(e-3), involving two generation events
for the new entity eN . Although this is a valid pattern, the two generation events must
be simultaneous by C1 above. The intuitive interpretation for this pattern is that each
of the two activities generated one entity in source(eN ), and that the abstraction makes
these two events indistinguishable. Formally, nothing further needs to be done to the
graph. However one can restore the more natural pattern whereby one single generation
event is recorded for eN , by propagating the grouping to the set of generating activities.
In the example, this leads to the graph in Fig. 4(e-3).
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Fig. 4. e-grouping and a-grouping
4 Policy model
Having outlined the grouping operator, we now present a simple policy language to let
users specify one or more grouping sets Vgr for abstraction. We refer to these users
as Policy Setters (PS). Our approach consists of two phases. The first phase involves
annotating each node n with a sensitivity value s(n) and/or a utility value u(n). These
annotations are independent of any intended receiver of the abstracted graph. In the
second phase, a grouping set Vgr is generated for a specific receiver r, denoted Vgr(r)
for clarity. We assume, as in Bell-Lapadula [4], that a pre-defined clearance level cl(r)
is associated with r. The nodes to be abstracted are simply those with sensitivity higher
than cl(r): Vgr(r) = {v ∈ V |s(n) ≥ cl(r)}.
A policy is a sequence of rules. Each rule (i) identifies a set of nodes, and (ii) assigns
a sensitivity to each of those nodes. Node selection is achieved using a simple form of
path expressions on the graph, combined with filter conditions. Keeping simplicity of
use by non-expert PS in mind, we have chosen a simplified fragment of regular path
expressions on graphs [15]. The example rules in Fig. 5 apply to the graph in Fig. 1:
list classifications [Unclassified, Classified, Protected, Secret];
for all (act used data)
where (data.Status >= Secret in classifications (def true)) setSensitivity(act, 7);
for all (process used data)
where (data descendantOf d14)) setSensitivity(data, 10);
Fig. 5. Example Policy rules
The rules are executed in sequence. List declares a domain-specific ordered enu-
meration of constants, called Classifications. The path expression in the first
command is a simple pattern where act and data are variables, and used is the used
relation. The pattern is then matched against the graph and the variables are bound
to nodes. The filter condition predicates on the values of properties associated to the
nodes. Here the value of data.Status is expected to be one of the constants in the
classification list. This predicate selects all nodes with value at least Secret
in the ordered list. The activity nodes that satisfy the conditions have their sensitiv-
ity set to 7.7 Rather than allowing arbitrary regular path expressions in the language,
we expose specific traversal operators. One example is descendantOf, which returns all
nodes reachable from a given start node. An example of its use is the second rule above.
Rule evaluation binds variables process and data to activity and entity nodes a, e,
respectively, such that used(a, e) holds and e is any node that is reachable from node
with id d14 (a constant value).
Utility is the counterpart to sensitivity. It denotes the interest of the provenance
owner in ensuring that a node be retained as part of the graph, as it represents important
evidence which is not sensitive. Recall from our earlier example that grouping may
remove non-selected nodes in order to preserve validity, a possibly undesirable side-
effect. The utility values associated to different nodes are used to quantify such loss of
utility. Let Vret = V \Vgr be the set of nodes not intended for grouping, and V ′ret ⊂ Vret
the nodes which were in fact retained after grouping. The residual utility is simply
RU V =
∑
n∈V ′ret u(n)∑
n∈Vret u(n)
(2)
which is maximized for V ′ret = Vret. Policy setters who experiment with different
policy rules, i.e., using a test set of provenance graphs, may use RU V as a quantitative
indicator of utility loss associated with a given policy and receiver.
4.1 ProvAbs tool
The Provenance Abstraction Model is implemented as part of a project involving confi-
dentiality protection for provenance. The main purpose of the ProvAbs tool is to let a
PS explore partial disclosure options, by experimenting with various policy settings and
clearance level thresholds. Users may load a graph in PROV-N format [16] and either
7 A default value can be specified, i.e. for the cases where a data node has no Status property,
or the property has no value.
specify a policy interactively, or load a pre-defined policy file. The output consists of
a graphical depiction of the graph, annotated with its sensitivity values (these are the
coloured boxes in Fig. 1), as well as the final abstract version of the graph. The resid-
ual utility value (2) is also returned. Provenance graphs are stored in the Neo4J graph
database (neo4j.org). Policy expressions are evaluated using a combination of the
Neo4J Traverse API and Cypher queries. ProvAbs and its documentation are publicly
available.8
5 Summary
In this paper we have presented a Provenance Abstraction Model (PAM) and its imple-
mentation, ProvAbs. PAM is based on aGroup operator, which replaces a set of nodes
in a PROV graph with a new abstract node while preserving the validity of the graph. A
simple notion of convexity of the set of nodes to be replaced ensures that the rewriting
does not introduce new cycles. Due to space limitations, the scope of this paper is lim-
ited to PGgu/ea graphs, which only include generation, usage relations on Activity and
Entity nodes. A more comprehensive model, including its extension to Agents, can be
found in our report [5]. Encouraged by this initial study, we are now developing a more
comprehensive model of abstraction that accounts for larger fragments of PROV — a
complex specification in its own right.
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